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Note
Statutory Forfeitures: The Taking
Of Pearson's Yacht
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
It is the peculiar genius and strength of the common law that no
decision is stare decisis when it has lost its usefulness in our social
evolution; it is distinguished, and if times have sufficiently
changed, overruled. Judicial opinions do not always preserve the
social statics of another generation.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Calero-ToZedo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,2 the United
States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its longstanding position
that forfeiture statutes may be constitutionally applied to innocent
property owners such as lessors, bailors, and secured creditors. The
Court also held that seizure for purposes of forfeiture constitutes
an "extraordinary situation ' 3 which justifies postponing notice and
an adversary hearing. The decision overturned a lower court ruling
which held the seizure and forfeiture to be unconstitutional on two
distinct grounds: as a taking of property for government use with-
out just compensation and as a taking of property without adequate
notice and hearing.
4
Pearson Yacht Leasing Company had leased a pleasure yacht
to two Puerto Rican residents in March 1971. Marijuana was dis-
covered on the yacht in May 1972, and one of the lessees was
charged with violation of the Controlled Substances Act of Puerto
Rico 5 In July 1972, two months after the discovery of marijuana,
the authorities seized the yacht pursuant to Puerto Rican law. The
1. Jayne, V.C., in Carroll v. Local 269, I.B.E.W., 31 A.2d 223, 225 (N.J. Ch.
1943).
2. 416 U.S. 663 (1974), rev'g 363 F. Supp. 1337 (D.P.R. 1973).
3. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).
4. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337 (D.P.R. 1973).
5. P.R. LAws AN. tit. 24, § 2101 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
6. Id., § 2512(a) (4) (b) (Supp. 1973) states:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico:
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yacht was forfeited to the government when a challenge to the sei-
zure was not made within 15 days after service of notice.7 The
lessor Pearson was given neither notice of the seizure and forfeiture
nor an opportunity to be heard.8 Only when the lessee fell in ar-
rears on his rent payments did the Company become aware of the
forfeiture.9 "It [was] conceded that appellee [Pearson] was 'in
no way... involved in the criminal enterprise carried on by [the]
lessee' and 'had no knowledge that its property was being used in
connection with or in violation of [Puerto Rican law].' "10 The
lessor Company had, in fact, inserted a provision in the lease agree-
ment forbidding any illegal use of the yacht." Despite the Com-
pany's lack of culpability, seizure and forfeiture of their property
was held to be constitutional.
This note argues that such seizure and forfeiture of beneficial
property 2 of innocent owners 13 serves no legislative purpose and
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, mount or
vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport,
or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment or property described in clauses
(1) and (2) of this subsection ....
Marijuana is classified as a controlled substance to which section 2512
applies. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 2202(c) (Supp. 1973).
7. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, § 1722(e) (Supp. 1973) provides:
(c) After fifteen (15) days have elapsed since service of no-
tice of the seizure without the person or persons with interest
in the property seized have filed the corresponding challenge,
... the officer under whose authority the seizure took place,
... may provide for the sale at auction of the seized property,
or may set the same aside for official use of the Government
of Puerto Rico.
8. The lessee was given proper notice as required by § 1722 (a) but failed
to challenge the seizure.
9. 416 U.S. at 668.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
12. There is an important distinction between the two classes of property
generally subject to forfeiture. Contraband per se describes property
which is inherently dangerous and the possession or distribution of
which is itself usually a crime. Certain types of guns, narcotics, liq-
uor, and gambling devices are contraband per se. Derivative contra-
band is property which has some beneficial use such as automobiles,
boats, airplanes, and currency. This article is concerned only with the
forfeiture of derivative contraband. For further discussion of this dis-
tinction, see Comment, Forfeitures-Civil or Criminal?, 43 TEmp. L.Q.
191, 195 (1970); 21 KAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (1973). The Supreme Court
has recognized the distinction in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsyl-
vania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965).
13. The term "innocent owners" includes lessors, bailors, and secured
creditors who are unaware of any criminal enterprise which involves
property in which they have an interest.
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should be held unconstitutional. The notice and hearing problems
that accompany this procedure are beyond the scope of this article.
14
II. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF FORFEITURES
Modern forfeiture 15 statutes originate from two sources, deodand
and common law forfeiture.16 The law of deodand, which means
"given to God," required forfeiture to the King, as a religious sacri-
fice, of an instrument that had caused death so there would be
money to pay for Masses to be said for the deceased's soul. The
action was characterized as against the "thing" itself. 7 Blackstone
criticized deodand as a "superstition" inherited from "the blind days
of popery" and thus condemned the seizure of the property of an
innocent owner.18 The second source from which the modem stat-
utes originated was common law forfeiture. It was invoked when
an offense was committed by the owner against the crown. Black-
stone could justify this as the sacrifice society evokes for the viola-
tion, by one of its members, of the fundamental contract of associa-
tion.11 9
14. There is no intention to minimize the importance of the notice and
hearing issue. Indeed, the district court in Pearson felt compelled to
hold the seizure and forfeiture invalid purely for failure of notice and
hearing. Before Pearson there was some disagreement among state
courts as to whether due process requires pre-seizure notice and hear-
ing in forfeiture cases. Compare City of Everett v. Slade, 83 Wash.
2d 80, 515 P.2d 1295 (1973) and State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Ram-
bler, 191 Neb. 462, 215 N.W.2d 849 (1974). Moreover, in Pearson the
Company was given no post-seizure notice of the impending forfeiture.
Due process requires that such notice be "reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."
Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40 (1970), quoting Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
15. The primary meaning of "forfeit" is "to lose." BLAcK's LAw DicTox-
ARY 778 (4th ed. 1968). Forfeiture, in the context of the Pearson
case, has been defined as "the divestiture of property without compen-
sation, in consequence of ... an offense, and is a method deemed
necessary by the Legislature to restrain the commission of the offense
and to aid in its prevention." 36 Am. JuiL 2D Forfeitures and Penalties
§ 1 (1968).
16. See Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of
Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Finkel-
stein].
17. 0. HOLMEs, THE Co MoN LAw ch. 1 (1881). The law of deodand was
based on the proposition that "'if an ox gore a man that he die, the
ox shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten'." Goldsmith Grant
Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921) (citing BLAcKsToNE).
18. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMEVNTARIES *300.
19. Id.
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Federal and state governments in America adopted the practice
of forfeitures. Early cases sustaining the validity of such actions
characterized them as in rem seizures. 20 The property itself was
held to be the object punished; thus, the owner's guilt was
deemed to be irrelevant.21 Since the action was in rem rather than
in personam, and therefore civil rather than criminal, the standard
of proof was "a preponderance of the evidence" instead of "beyond
a reasonable doubt. ' 22 Although this characterization of the action
has continued to be applied 23 and was preserved by Pearson, it is
a judicial fiction and has not gone uncriticized. As early as 1818,
Chief Justice Marshall remarked that "[t] he mere wood, iron, and
sails of the ship cannot, of themselves, violate the law.
24
Van Oster v. Kansas25 offered another judicial fiction to justify
the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property. The Court upheld
the forfeiture of an automobile used to transport intoxicating liquor
in violation of Kansas law, even though the owner had no knowl-
edge of the illegal act.
[The cases] suggest that certain uses of property may be regarded
as so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril.
The law thus builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use
and precludes evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial
inquiry as to collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged in-
nocent owner.26
"By dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry," the Court
established a conclusive presumption 27 that collusion would exist
between the wrongdoer and any alleged innocent owner.
20. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); Dobbins Distillery
v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877); United States v. One Ford Coupe
Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
21. See note 20 supra. In United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43
U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844), the Court held the innocence of
the owner to be irrelevant in a forfeiture action and stated: "The
vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the
guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without
any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner."
22. See note 20 supra.
23. See, e.g., United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th
Cir. 1972).
24. United States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (No. 15,612)
(C.C.D. Va. 1818) (dictum). In Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347,
365 (1808), Chief Justice Marshall also stated that "the law is not
understood to forfeit the property of owners or consignees, on account
of the misconduct of mere strangers, over whom such owners ...
could have no control."
25. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
26. Id. at 467-68.
27. An irrebuttable, or conclusive presumption, provides that the existence
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The principle of stare decisis has performed yeoman service in
perpetuating these two fictions. In Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United
States,28 the Court, though admitting the potential inequity of for-
feiture as applied to an innocent owner, stated that "[w]hether the
reason for [the forfeiture statute at issue] be artificial or real, it
is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of
the country to be now displaced. '29 Thus the rule has been estab-
lished, and preserved, that there is no constitutional violation in
the statutory forfeiture of property of an innocent owner, who has
entrusted such property to a person who has used it illegally.
The concept of forfeiture as an in rem, civil action was clouded
by Boyd v. United States.30 There the Court held statutory forfei-
tures to be "quasi-criminal" for purposes of invoking the protection
of the fourth amendment and the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment. In Boyd, private papers that had been illegally
seized were used as evidence in an action to forfeit goods, which
were alleged to have been fraudulently imported. The Court rea-
soned that it would be anomalous to admit illegally seized evidence
in a forfeiture action, while refusing to admit such evidence in crim-
inal actions, since the purpose of both actions is to deter commission
of criminal acts. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Boyd in One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,3 1 observing that forfeiture is
clearly a penalty for a criminal offense and can result in even
greater punishment than the criminal prosecution.
3 2
In recent years courts have continued to express their disfavor
of one fact is conclusive evidence of the existence of another fact. See
note 46 infra.
28. 254U.S. 505 (1921).
29. Id. at 511. See also United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d
1168 (5th Cir. 1972). There, a secured creditor intervened in a for-
feiture action and filed for remission of its security interest. Although
the creditor was completely innocent of any wrongdoing, the courts
denied its claim. The extent of the court's reasoning was that "[t]he
Bank's due process arguments are without merit," citing Van Oster v.
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1927).
30. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). McGonigle, the driver and owner of the automo-
bile subject to forfeiture, was arrested and charged for violation of
Pennsylvania's liquor laws. The record did not disclose which of-
fense (s) McGonigle was charged with having committed.
32. If convicted of any one of the possible offenses involved, how-
ever, he would be subject, if a first offender, to a minimum
penalty of a $100.00 fine and a maximum penalty of a $500.00
fine. In this forfeiture proceeding he was subject to the loss
of his automobile, which at the time involved had an estimated
value of approximately $1,000.00, a higher amount than the
maximum fine in the criminal proceeding.
Id. at 700-01.
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with the characterization of forfeitures as actions in rem. In Mc-
Keehan v. United States,33 the Sixth Circuit held the forfeiture of
firearms of an innocent owner to be unconstitutional as a depriva-
tion of property without just compensation. Because there was no
valid legislative, administrative or revenue purpose to justify the
in rem characterization of the forfeiture, the court considered the
action to be in personam to afford the owner certain constitutional
safeguards. "In so doing, [the court was] not creating a 'legal fic-
tion,' but destroying one. [The court was] characterizing the facts
underlying this action as to their substance."34 Thus it was widely
presumed in the lower federal courts, until Pearson, that forfeiture
of property would violate due process if the owner lacked knowl-
edge of the commission of the crime.3 5
The Supreme Court, in United States v. United States Coin and
Currency,3 6 seemed to support this proposition, holding that the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was applicable
to actions brought under section 7302 of Title 26 of the United States
Code, involving forfeiture of money used in violation of federal
gambling laws. The Court reasoned that "when forfeiture statutes
are viewed in their entirety" it is obvious they are to be applied
only to those who are "significantly involved in a criminal enter-
prise. 3 7 After expressing strong disenchantment with the govern-
33. 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971).
34. Id. at 745.
35. Id. See also Suhomlin v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md.
1972); United States v. One Ford Two-Door-Sedan, 69 F. Supp. 417 (D.
Idaho 1947). In United States v. One 1971 Ford Truck, 346 F. Supp.
613 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the court did away with forfeitures against the
property of innocent owners, describing such an action as an "enclave
of injustice." Id. at 618. Other federal courts, though feeling bound
by prior rulings, have, nevertheless, criticized the rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d 931, 932-33 (9th Cir.
1972). In United States v. One 1962 Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp.
1019 (N.D. Ill. 1964), the court stated that as a legislator, it would ex-
press grave doubts as to the validity of forfeitures that affect innocent
lienholders. In United States v. One 1961 Cadillac, 207 F. Supp. 693
(E.D. Tenn. 1962), the court recognized the constitutionality of such
forfeitures but also expressed the view that
[t]he laws relating to forfeitures do cause one who is raised
in the traditions of the Anglo-American principles of justice
and who is committed to the principles of due process and just
compensation to search closely for a constitutional violation.
Id. at 698. But see United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d
1168 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972); United States
v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 457 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 850 (1972).
36. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
37. Id. at 721-22.
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ment's characterization of the proceeding as an in rem suit, the
Court stated in strong dictum:
Before the Government's attempt to distinguish the Boyd case
could even begin to convince, we would first have to be satisfied
that a forfeiture statute, with such a broad sweep, did not raise
serious constitutional questions under that portion of the Fifth
Amendment which commands that no person shall be "deprived of
property without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation." Even Blackstone,
who is not known as a biting critic of the English legal tradition,
condemned the seizure of the property of the innocent as based
upon a "superstition" inherited from the "blind days" of feudalism.
And this Court has recognized the difficulty of reconciling the
broad scope of traditional forfeiture doctrine with the requirements
of the Fifth Amendment.88
Underlying this analysis was undoubtedly a deep concern that the
doctrine of the "offending res," a judicial fiction, was being used
as a subterfuge by which the government could punish a blameless
individual.3 9
III. THE TAKING OF PEARSON'S YACHT
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture
of Pearson's yacht despite the Company's complete innocence of the
crime committed by the lessee. Retreating from the dictum in Coin
and Currency, the Court deferred to the "punitive and deterrent
purposes" of the Puerto Rican narcotics laws, stating that their ap-
plication to innocent owners would encourage greater care in the
transfer of property.40 To justify this position the Pearson case
preserved the critical distinction between consent to use, which is
an essential prerequisite to invoking a forfeiture statute, and
consent to use for an unlawful purpose. The Court held that
a mere showing of consent to use is constitutionally sufficient for
forfeiture and knowing consent for illegal use is not required.
41
38. Id. at 720-21.
39. One commentator, writing from an historical perspective, has sug-
gested that the old law of deodand was more justified than present
day forfeiture since the execution of the proverbial ox expressed a
genuine concern about human life. Forfeiture actions today commonly
result in the punishment of a blameless individual and, more remark-
ably, a blameless inanimate object. Pearson is such a case. "If any-
thing, the legal historians who have heaped such contempt upon the
old deodand, would have been upon firmer moral ground if they cast
their critical scrutiny instead upon its modern counterpart." Finkel-
stein, supra note 16 at 252.
40. 416 U.S. at 686-88.
41. Id. at 689. The Court stated that it would be difficult to justify con-
stitutionally forfeiture of property that had been taken from the owner
without his consent.
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This distinction presents several problems. It is difficult to un-
derstand how the objective of curbing illicit narcotics traffic can
be achieved by forfeiting the property of innocent owners. The
purpose of any forfeiture statute should be rationally related to
the conduct of the owner since he alone is the party to whom the
forfeiture applies, and a showing of consent to use should not be
the only prerequisite to invoking forfeiture. As Justice Harlan
stated in Coin and Currency:
From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference
between a man who "forfeits" $8,674 because he has used the
money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a "crimi-
nal fine" of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct. In
both instances, noney liability is predicated upon a finding of the
owner's wrongful conduct; .. .42
Yet in Pearson, Puerto Rico conceded that the Company was "com-
pletely innocent" of any wrongful conduct,43 but the Company was
"punished, '44 despite its innocence.
There is another difficulty in basing forfeiture on a showing of
consent to use. The lease agreement drawn by the lessor Pear-
son expressly precluded the use of the yacht for illegal purposes,
4 5
so that when the lessee was arrested, he was using the yacht beyond
the original consent of Pearson.
A further constitutional objection to the forfeiture in Pearson,
not addressed by the Court, concerned the existence of an irrebutta-
ble presumption.4 6 By "dispensing with judicial enquiry"4 7 into the
42. 401 U.S. at 718 (emphasis added).
43. 363 F. Supp. at 1340.
44. Applying the rationale of Coin and Currency, the Pearson Company
was punished to the extent of $19,800.00, the fair market value of the
yacht. 416 U.S. at 688 n.4.
45. Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. Irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored. The reason is
that "when [an irrebuttable presumption is] not necessarily or univer-
sally true in fact," it is irrational and cannot be squared with the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). It is apparent that irrebuttable pre-
sumptions are becoming increasingly disfavored. The Vlandis case
recognized that Connecticut students had a constitutional right to re-
but a conclusive presumption that a student would be a nonresident
throughout his university career if his legal address at the time of ad-
mission was outside Connecticut. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LeFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974), invalidated school board rules requiring maternity
leaves for teachers entering their fifth or sixth month of pregnancy.
The rules conclusively presumed "that every pregnant school teacher
who reaches the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy is physically inca-
pable of continuing." Id. at 644. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), held unconstitutional an Illinois statute which irrebuttably
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innocence of the property owner, the Puerto Rican statute irrebut-
tably presumed the owner's collusion in the crime, committed by
another, simply because his property was used in the commission
of the crime. 48  No recourse was provided by which the owner
could rebut the presumption.
4 9
The Court held another statutory scheme based on fault to be
an unconstitutional violation of procedural due process in Bell v.
Burson.50 That case involved a Georgia law which required an un-
insured motorist, who was involved in an accident, to post security
for the amount of damages claimed by the injured party. In the
event the motorist could not comply, his driver's license and motor
vehicle registration were suspended. Since the entire statutory
plan was concerned with fault, "[the State] could not conclusively
presume the fault from the fact that the uninsured motorist was
involved in an accident, and could not, therefore, suspend his driv-
er's license without a hearing on that crucial factor."
51
In Bell, lack of judicial recourse on the issue of the driver's fault
was fatal to Georgia's law. The driver there was integrally in-
volved in the activity, the automobile accident, which the state
sought to regulate. In Pearson, however, it was conceded that the
Company was not even involved in the criminal enterprise. Since
judicial inquiry was required in Bell on the fault issue, the Com-
pany in Pearson should have been given a hearing on the issue of
presumed that unmarried fathers were incompetent to raise their chil-
dren. See also United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S.
508 (1973). For an extensive discussion of the recent presumption
cases and a suggested new analysis see Comment, Irrebuttable Pre-
sumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449 (1975).
47. 272 U.S. at 467. By dispensing with judicial inquiry into each individ-
ual case, evasions of forfeiture statutes can be avoided. The Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico has cited Van Oster with approval in General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. District Court, 70 P.R.R. 898, 900 (1950),
and applied its reasoning to justify the statute under which Pearson
was prosecuted.
If we seek to assimilate criteria of criminal intention in the
case of third parties, we would be granting immunity to of-
fenders of the law who by means of a clever strategy would
be in condition to violate it by employing vehicles belonging
to others without the risk of confiscation.
Commonwealth v. Superior Court, 94 P.R.R. 687, 691 (1967).
48. Use of any conveyance to transport or in any manner facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of an unlawful
controlled substance is the only element required for forfeiture. See
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 2512 (Supp. 1974). The owner's state of
mind is irrelevant.
49. See Commonwealth v. Superior Court, 94 P.R.R. 687, 697 (1967).
50. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
51. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 447 (1973), describing the holding in
Bell.
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intent, or, at least, on whether ordinary care was used in the trans-
fer of the yacht.
No element of knowledge, intent or criminal involvement was
required for forfeiture under the Puerto Rican law, yet that was
the critical factor underlying the entire statutory scheme of Puerto
Rico's narcotics laws. The conveyance subject to forfeiture must
have been used in commission of a criminal offense, 52 and that of-
fense could be established only by a showing that the defendant
knowingly or intentionally manufactured, distributed, dispensed,
conveyed or concealed a controlled substance.53 Since the whole
statutory scheme involved in Pearson was created to punish and
deter intentional conduct, forfeiture of the Company's yacht should
have been held to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment because of the Company's innocence.
Although Puerto Rico does have an interest in deterring the un-
lawful transportation of illicit drugs, 54 this does not justify the pre-
sumption of collusion since other reasonable means exist to estab-
lish the pertinent fact, criminal involvement or knowledge, 55 on
which the deterrent objective is premised. Federal and state courts
are using remission and mitigation procedures which allow an
owner to prove his innocence or lack of knowledge and thereby
reclaim his interest.5 6 Such procedures eliminate the gross overin-
clusiveness of forfeiture statutes as applied to innocent owners, but
do not threaten the efficiency of federal and state narcotics laws
since the burden of proof is placed on the owner.
57
52. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(a) (4) (Supp. 1973).
53. Id. § 2401.
54. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
55. The fact of the owner's guilt or innocence could be ascertained at a
pre-forfeiture hearing as easily as it could in any other criminal case.
Assuming arguendo that such fact could be established, it appears that
the only purpose for disallowing such a hearing would be administra-
tive convenience. Viandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451 (1973), estab-
lishes that:
The State's interest in administrative ease and certainty can-
not, in and of itself, save the conclusive presumption from in-
validity under the Due Process Clause where there are other
reasonable and practical means of establishing the pertinent
facts on which the State's objective is premised.
56. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-4,135(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38 § 36-2 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1974). Forfeitures under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a) (1970), which is the model of the Puerto Rican statute
at issue in Pearson, are subject to remission and mitigation in forfei-
tures resulting from violations of certain internal revenue laws. See
generally United States v. Morris, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246, 293-95
(1825); United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715,
721 (1971).
57. See note 56 supra.
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The Pearson court preserved the antiquated in rem label as ap-
plied to forfeitures that were admittedly "punitive" in effect,-,s
thereby perpetuating the civil-criminal distinction in forfeiture ac-
tions. Increasingly, legislative bodies are resorting to the device
of "civil" penalties to avoid the administrative inconvenience of
criminal prosecution.59 It is questionable whether Congress or a
state legislature should be allowed to deny a defendant certain
rights, such as double jeopardy, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and establishment of mens rea, merely by changing the label of
an action from "criminal" to "civil." It can be argued that, "crimi-
nal prosecutions masquerading in the guise of civil penalties
[should] not be tolerated; the alleged offender in a civil penalty
case should receive the same protections afforded a defendant in
a criminal case." 60
By deferring to this legislative labelling process, the Court in
Pearson has abdicated its responsibility to protect the constitutional
rights of innocent property owners. Failure to require a showing
of mens rea or scienter as a minimum constitutional requirement
in the prosecution of forfeitures results in the forfeiture action serv-
ing no valid state purpose. Instead, it should be considered a taking
of property without due process of law or a taking of property for
government use without just compensation.61 There is an anomaly
in requiring a showing of mens rea in the prosecution of the lessee,
as was done in Pearson,62 and not requiring the same showing in
the forfeiture action against the owner-lessor, who was not involved
in any criminal enterprise. Assuming arguendo that the purpose
of the criminal and forfeiture actions is the same, 63 it would be
a denial of equal protection of the law if a showing of mens rea
were required for the party charged in connection with the criminal
offense 64 and not for the owner of the property subject to forfeiture.
58. [S]eizure permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction
over the property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings,
thereby fostering the public interest in preventing continued
illicit use of the property and in enforcing criminal sanctions.
416 U.S. at 679.
59. See Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants
in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 ComnEm L. REv. 478 (1974).
60. Id. at 482.
61. See McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971); see also
cases cited in note 35 supra and accompanying text.
62. The statute under which the lessee was charged, requires that the act
be committed "knowingly or intentionally." P.R. LAws ANN- tit. 24,
§ 2401 (Supp. 1973).
63. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of both
forfeiture and criminal actions is punishment. See United States v.
United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971); One 1958 Ply-
mouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1965).
64. Inextricably related to mens rea is the eighth amendment safeguard
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The Court in Pearson had the opportunity to create some sem-
blance of uniformity in the area of statutory forfeitures, but in-
stead, created more confusion. The Court expressly refused to
overrule those prior decisions which had characterized forfeitures
as in rem suits and which had conclusively presumed the fault of
the owner,65 yet stated in dictum that the forfeiture of an innocent
owner's property would be unconstitutional if he proved he had
done everything reasonably possible to avoid unlawful use.66 In
view of this, it is arguable that the Court initiated a new standard
which would disallow forfeitures where the innocent owner could
prove he was neither involved in the criminal enterprise, nor negli-
gent in entrusting the property to a third person. However, the
Court's preservation of prior decisions, holding the conduct of the
owner to be irrelevant, cannot be reconciled with this interpreta-
tion.
67
against cruel and unusual punishment. The eighth amendment states
that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." This provision
reflects a basic feeling within our society that the sentence imposed
in any action should be roughly proportionate to the "crime" com-
mitted. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892). Thus it has
been suggested by some commentators that forfeiture might qualify as
an excessive fine in violation of the eighth amendment. See, e.g., 51
TnxAs L. Rxv. 1411, 1419 (1973). For example, in Pearson, it could be
argued that the loss of a $19,800.00 yacht is disproportionate to the "of-
fense" committed, that of innocently leasing the yacht to one who used
it in commission of a criminal offense. Yet the eighth amendment has
never been considered a bar to forfeitures, largely because of their
"civil" characterization and their failure to "shock" the judicial sense
of equity. Id.
65. 416 U.S. at 680.
66. It . . . has been implied that it would be difficult to reject the
constitutional claim of an owner whose property subjected to
forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or con-
sent .... Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who
proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of
the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that rea-
sonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to
conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was
not unduly oppressive.
416 U.S. at 689-90.
67. The ultimate disposition of the case also seems at odd& with this inter-
pretation. Puerto Rico's lack of any basis to challenge the forfeiture
was precisely what Pearson was complaining about. Puerto Rico pro-
vided no judicial recourse by which an innocent party could prove ei-
ther his lack of knowledge or his use of reasonable care. If this dictum
had been applied, the case should have been remanded for a hearing
on the issue of Pearson's reasonable care in leasing the yacht to the
lessee.
STATUTORY FORFEITURES
Another source of confusion is the phrase "completely innocent"
as used to describe the owner's conduct. That phrase is inherently
ambiguous, yet the Court does not adequately define what conduct
by the "innocent" owner is constitutionally protected from forfei-
ture statutes.
Additional problems are presented by the Pearson decision since
many courts had literally rewritten state as well as federal forfei-
ture statutes to require a showing of knowledge of the property
owner in commission of a crime. 68 Further, the uncertainty of the
law regarding forfeitures will continue to have ramifications out-
side the judicial system.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to show that forfeiture statutes as ap-
plied to innocent property owners are unconstitutional. Actions
brought under such statutes result in a taking of property without
due process and just compensation. Further, they are premised
upon a conclusive presumption of the owner's collusive conduct and
therefore violate procedural due process. By characterizing forfei-
tures as in rem actions, property owners are denied the procedural
safeguards afforded to defendants in criminal prosecutions. More-
over, forfeitures are incompatible with the mobile society in which
we live. For these reasons, forfeiture of property of innocent own-
ers should be abandoned.
Steven E. Achelpohl '75
68. For state cases see, e.g., In Te One 1965 -Ford Mustang, 105 Ariz. 293,
463 P.2d 827 (1970); 1957 Chevrolet v. Division of Narcotic Control, 27
Ill. 2d 429, 189 N.E.2d 347 (1963). For a collection of such cases, see
Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 172 (1973). Coin and Currency held that federal
forfeiture actions with respect to money used in violation of gambling
laws required a showing that the owner was "significantly involved
in [the] criminal enterprise." 401 U.S. at 722.
69. For example, car rental agencies, whose business crosses state lines,
will be forced to conduct their operations with extraordinary care to
protect their property from statutory forfeitures. There will also be
difficult conflicts of law problems, such as to what extent a nonresi-
dent owner should be bound by the investigation requirements of the
state in which the criminal act is committed and the forfeiture action
prosecuted. See, e.g., People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595,
311 P.2d 480 (1957), where a nonresident creditor was held not bound
by California's "reasonable investigation" requirement.
A fear of forfeiture based on innocent conduct of the owner may
also cause potential lenders and lessors to avoid doing business with
anyone who has a criminal record. This analysis assumes that prop-
erty owners even contemplate forfeiture of their property, or that they
could accurately predict whether a bailee, secured debtor, or lessee
would use the property in the commission of a criminal offense. These
assumptions themselves are uncertain and should not be allowed to
justify the harsh penalty of forfeiture.
